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On Linguistic and Epistemological Foundations of 
Language Pedagogy 
Csaba Czeglédi  
The central issues in pedagogy in general are inextricably bound to 
fundamental questions about the nature of knowledge and its attainment by 
humans. Language pedagogy in particular presupposes a coherent answer to 
basic questions about the nature of human language, its acquisition, and its 
use. The paper shows how basic assumptions about the structure and 
acquisition of language in generative grammar are gracefully consistent with 
constructivist theories of knowledge and learning and how this consistency 
contributes to a better understanding of the goals and tasks of language 
pedagogy. 
Introduction 
For in part obvious reasons, language pedagogy is intimately and naturally 
related to linguistic theory and epistemology. Since language pedagogy 
presupposes some understanding of what language is, it cannot fail to consider 
what linguistic theory has to say about it. This much, at least, seems fairly 
obvious. Equally clearly, language pedagogy, as well as pedagogy in general, 
will necessarily be based on some general assumptions concerning the nature of 
human knowledge and learning, to use the traditional term for processes 
involved in the attainment of knowledge by humans. Third, given that pedagogy 
involves verbal communication in various ways, it must be committed to some 
assumptions about the nature of human communication, an issue not discussed 
in any detail here.  
Research into language and cognition has made important progress over the 
past few decades. Significant results in these areas of human understanding have 
important implications for pedagogy in general and for language pedagogy in 
particular, the topic of this essay. Given the intimate connection between a 
theory of language learning and education on the one hand and theories of 
language and cognition on the other, some of the implications of recent 
developments in the latter for language pedagogy are fairly obvious. Yet, it 
seems as if they are almost completely ignored in language education. The 
purpose of this paper is to clarify some aspects of the connections just mentioned 
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and their natural implications for our understanding of language education and 
learning. 
From a conventional pedagogical perspective, the picture painted here may 
seem disappointing. Some may view it as a critical and pessimistic account of 
some general pedagogic principles and their consequences. But that is a 
misunderstanding. True, the present discussion is indeed critical of most, if not 
all, of the general assumptions apparently adopted in conventional pedagogy, but 
it is not pessimistic at all about the development of our understanding of the 
processes involved in education and learning. If anything, it is highly optimistic 
about possible, and apparently necessary, changes in pedagogical theory in 
general and in the theory of language education in particular. 
For the purposes of this discussion, I follow the pedagogical-theoretic 
convention in assuming that questions of foreign language learning and teaching 
are part of the subject matter of pedagogy, as traditionally understood, although 
this is not at all self-evident. Whether or not learning processes in individuals 
and educational activities performed and controlled by teachers are to be 
accounted for in a pedagogical theory depends on what we consider to be 
pedagogy in the first place and, second, on how we regard the processes 
conventionally assigned to pedagogical theory. For a non-conventional approach 
to these issues and some interesting conclusions to the effect that pedagogical 
theory is essentially deprived of all its traditional subject matter, see Nahalka 
(1997a). 
The traditional assumption is that educational theory is concerned with the 
learning and teaching of individuals, with a primary focus on institutionalized 
forms and contexts of instruction, i.e., learning and teaching in schools (cf. Falus 
2005). Mental processes like learning conventionally fall within the subject 
matter of psychology. Teachers’ behaviors and activities, like everyone else’s, 
are a function of their knowledge and abilities, also the topic of psychological 
inquiry. If these processes are taken to constitute the subject matter of 
educational theory, as is traditionally assumed, then the natural conclusion to 
draw is that educational theory is a branch of human psychology. Indeed, as 
Nahalka (2005) points out, modern pedagogical theory has always borrowed all 
its central categories, including the concepts of knowledge, competence, attitude, 
etc., from psychology. This may be viewed by some as an unwelcome, perhaps 
even painful, consequence, a possible sign of crisis. It might be disappointing to 
see that the conventional areas of pedagogical theory actually belong in the 
domain of a different science. 
Although pedagogy is indeed in a crisis, this is not because it falls into 
psychology. As a matter of fact, when it does, it falls into place, but I will not 
pursue this issue any further here. Regardless of one’s views on this and some 
related questions, the crisis pedagogy faces is caused not by factors without, but 
by some factors within. In the light of recent developments in epistemology, 
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some of pedagogy’s conventional assumptions about human knowledge and 
learning seem untenable. When a theory or science is faced with a crisis as deep 
as this, the standard solution is to radically revise its basic assumptions and 
construct an entirely different coherent theory.  
Some central issues in language pedagogy 
One of the two standard questions in education is what to teach. When that is 
answered, the second question that arises is how to teach that (cf. Falus 2005). 
Any answer to the first question is crucially determined by one’s beliefs and 
assumptions about the learning process. These involve some serious questions 
about what actually happens when a learner “learns something” and about what 
it is that a learner learns.  
An extremely naïve but apparently still very popular answer to the latter is 
that they learn what you say to them. On this assumption, the first major issue in 
education is reduced to the question of what to say to the learners. Although this 
question arises naturally and regularly in some form for any teacher or author of 
a textbook or any other teaching material, if taken to be a synonym of the 
question of what to teach, it implies that knowledge may be transferred from one 
individual to another through speaking to them, which is a serious 
misunderstanding of both the nature of knowledge and the nature of verbal 
communication. From a pedagogical perspective, one of the most important 
results in constructivist epistemology is the realization that knowledge transfer is 
impossible. This has serious implications for both of the standard questions in 
educational theory and raises some more general questions about the nature and 
possible goals of teaching. 
If the central questions in educational theory are taken to be questions about 
what knowledge to transfer or ‘give’ to learners and how to transfer it to them, 
and if knowledge in a teacher’s mind cannot be transferred into the learner’s 
mind directly through verbal communication or in any other way, then both 
questions become meaningless. On this interpretation, both must be discarded as 
incoherent and replaced by new questions about the goals of education and 
possible roles of the teacher (for a detailed discussion of these general issues, see 
Ludányi 2001).  
On constructivist assumptions, an individual’s knowledge is entirely 
constructed in and by the individual’s mind. None of it may come from any source 
external to a person’s mind, contrary to traditional empiricist assumptions about it. 
Knowledge construction and the resulting knowledge states are highly subjective 
and personal matters, processes and states internal to an individual’s mind (cf. 
Nahalka 1997a, b, c). Therefore, whatever questions arise in pedagogy about 
educational processes and their goals, they must be formulated in terms of the 
subjective process of knowledge construction in individuals (cf. Ludányi 2001).  
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The goal of foreign language teaching (FLT) is commonly formulated 
informally in terms of learners’ knowledge of a particular foreign language (FL). 
The process whereby this knowledge is attained by a learner is conventionally 
called foreign language learning (FLL), our primary concern here, with a focus 
on some general assumptions about learning that bear directly on teachers’ roles, 
expectations and possible goals of the teaching process. There is a range of 
related specific issues, such as questions about the now more-or-less standard 
distinction made between FLL and second language acquisition (cf. Krashen 
1981), for example, which I will not address. Nor will I discuss the question of 
what counts as a foreign or second language in any detail. Instead, I will focus 
on the nature of the learning process and the resulting mental states subsumed 
under the label ‘knowledge of FL.’ 
Whatever the distinctive features of foreignness of FL are, it is an instance 
of natural language (NL). It is clear, therefore, that a theory of FLT presupposes 
some understanding of what NL, or any particular language L, an instance of 
NL, is. From the perspective of language pedagogy, a theory of NL comes free: 
linguistic theory is concerned precisely with that. Without going unnecessarily 
deeply into matters of detail here, it will be highly relevant to consider, albeit 
very briefly and informally, some of the major findings in linguistic research 
over the past few decades, as they have important implications for some central 
assumptions in language pedagogy. 
As is now well known, almost to the extent of a linguistic commonplace, a 
distinction is made between two aspects of language: its knowledge and its use. 
The former is taken to be an internalized rule system that enables a speaker of a 
particular language L to construct and understand an infinite number of different 
sentences in L. By the use of language, we mean the ability of speakers of L to 
perform acts of verbal behavior and what is sometimes called symbolic thought. 
It may be interesting to note in passing that it is arguably the latter, also called 
the language of thought, that is the primary function of NL, not its externaliza-
tion in verbal communicative acts (cf. Chomsky 2007). A second, perhaps even 
more important, discovery about the nature of NL is that the only coherent 
notion of language is I-language (for internal language), a speaker’s ‘linguistic’ 
knowledge or competence, sometimes also called a mental grammar (cf. 
Chomsky 2000, 2004, 2005). Briefly, language is a mental mechanism or organ. 
The rules and principles it contains, as well as the structures constructed by 
them, are mental constructs.  
Given that any particular language is a form of knowledge in its speakers’ 
minds, one of the two major goals of FLT must be to facilitate learners’ 
attainment of the knowledge of FL, i.e., a mental grammar of FL. This 
immediately raises important questions about how a learner of FL attains that 
knowledge. This specific question takes us directly to the general 
epistemological problem of how any form of knowledge is attained by humans 
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and to an immediately relevant special variant of that: the problem of how 
knowledge of a language is attained. 
The second major goal of FLT is to facilitate learners’ attainment of the 
ability to use FL in verbal communication, sometimes called communicative 
competence. Although an important and reasonable goal, when it is 
(over)emphasized, sometimes resulting in misunderstanding, as is almost 
generally the case in what is known as the communicative approach to FLT (cf. 
Budai 2006), the heavy emphasis laid on it derives from the age-old traditional 
(false) assumption that communication is the primary function or use of 
language, very often accompanied by the equally false belief that the principles 
of the use of a particular language L are entirely specific to L. Surprisingly, 
nearly harmless in itself, when coupled with some other dubious or false 
assumptions about the nature and function of language, it may indeed lead to 
serious inefficiencies in FLT.  
Take what is perhaps the most obvious example of a serious 
misunderstanding. Although a truism, the idea that linguistic performance 
presupposes linguistic competence, which clearly applies not only to every 
speaker of a language but also to any foreign language learner, is often 
overlooked, apparently (cf. Budai 2006). If, for example, a learner of English as 
a foreign language does not possess a reasonably elaborate mental grammar of 
English that enables them to construct meaningful expressions in the language, 
then, quite simply, there is nothing for that learner to use in verbal 
communication, in the ordinary sense of the term.  
Perhaps less of a truism, though fairly straightforward, a human child is 
born not only with an innate faculty of language, but its biological endowments 
also include an innate understanding of logic and universal principles of human 
communication, among others. If correct, hypotheses about various kinds of 
innate faculties lead to the obvious conclusion that the knowledge that they 
represent need not (and cannot) be taught or learned. Crain and Khlentzos (2008) 
show, for example, that not only are all the elementary principles of what is 
otherwise known as classical logic innate in the human child, but they are 
unlearnable. If they were not there as part of the child’s biological endowments, 
they could not be obtained by learning. To take the argument an obvious step 
forward, if such aspects of knowledge are unlearnable, they must also be 
unteachable. This follows from the truism that whatever is unlearnable is also 
unteachable.  
Teachers often seem to have an intuitive understanding of elements of 
learners’ innate knowledge of some general principles of language and logic. 
Principles of anaphoric binding, for example, are never taught in an EFL class or 
course, but are tacitly assumed as universally known. This is justified, since the 
binding principles are part of the child’s innate universal grammar (UG) and as 
such apply to the relevant kinds of expressions (pronouns, anaphors, and other 
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sorts of noun phrases) in any language (cf. Chomsky 1981). Universal principles 
of language, logic, verbal communication, etc. are part of a learner’s prior 
knowledge, as it is commonly called in constructivist learning theory, which 
they bring to any particular FL learning task. Regardless of the extent to which 
FL teachers may or may not be aware of it, every one of them makes some 
assumptions about their learners’ prior knowledge and their ability to make use 
of that knowledge in learning, both, in fact, essential conditions for any learning 
as well as teaching. Clearly, the correctness or otherwise of such assumptions 
has a major effect on the efficiency of any kind of teaching.  
Apparently, teachers sometimes assume too much, as in vocabulary 
teaching, for example, sometimes too little, as in teaching communication in FL. 
It is often assumed that the little that is generally taught about the form and 
meaning of lexical items, which is very rarely more than what you find in 
standard dictionaries, which already presuppose a lot about their users’ 
knowledge and abilities, will suffice for the learner to construct acceptable 
meaningful expressions out of those items, supplemented by whatever else is 
required from their prior knowledge. Only too often, however, learners do not 
succeed, as any FL teacher can testify. A general reaction to such inaccuracies in 
learners’ verbal performance, based on a complex of partly tacit dubious 
assumptions, is to dismiss them as insignificant deviations from an assumed 
standard, successful communication in FL being the primary concern.  
It is often not assumed, in contrast, that learners have some prior 
understanding of general principles of verbal communication, like some fairly 
general strategies of making indirect directives or requests, for example. Such 
false assumptions may lead to a waste of some valuable teaching/learning time, 
or worse still, to confusion and loss of self-esteem in the learner. 
Assume, for instance, that a Hungarian child grows up in a family where 
most requests and other directives are made indirectly, most typically 
“disguised” as questions, sometimes as statements. She may easily be fluent in 
making indirect requests by age three. Assume, further, that she goes to school 
around age six and begins to study English as a foreign language. Let us also 
assume that her English teacher is a standard representative of the profession, 
laying a heavy emphasis on polite interrogative forms of making a request, as 
something specifically English. So this gets taught at some stage, regularly 
repeated and practiced, preferably in (pseudo-)communicative situational 
exercises, as dictated by the communicative principle. It is easy to predict that 
this child may feel a little confused, perhaps bored. (“This is being taught to me. 
So it is probably something important I should learn. This is something I know 
already, since that is how I always make a request in my own language. But why 
would my teacher teach me something she knows I know already? So probably 
there IS something about it I don’t know. I have no idea what that is. [Time goes 
by.] I still have no idea what that which I don’t know could be. Maybe I’m not 
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that smart, after all?”) When, of course, she is. She knows everything about it. 
That is what she has done all her young life every time she wanted somebody 
else to do something for her, i.e., made indirect requests. The only bit she could 
not have figured from her prior knowledge is what to do with the auxiliary and 
the subject in English, a matter of grammar, not of language use. 
To judge from the performance of intermediate or advanced learners, such 
as college students of English, the pendulum of language pedagogic assumptions 
keeps swinging this way and that. Sometimes even the most obvious conclusions 
and truisms similar to and including the ones briefly discussed above do not 
appear to receive the amount of attention and respect they merit. The expected 
and attested result is poor performance, as documented in Budai 2006, for 
example, which discusses some similar problems and possible causes. I will not 
pursue issues of language use any further here but focus on some fundamental 
questions of knowledge and learning in general, their implications for questions 
of knowledge and acquisition of language, and their relevance for linguistics and 
language pedagogy. 
As noted at the beginning, some understanding of what language is is 
central to language pedagogy. As has also been noted above, we do not have a 
coherent notion of language as such, divorced from its knowledge. What is 
informally called language is a form of knowledge, a state of a person’s mental 
subsystem that accounts for their ability to construct and understand what we 
call linguistic expressions, ultimately pairs of meaning and sound. The focus of 
linguistic research is on how (representations of) meaning and sound are paired 
with each other in human minds. Thus, the topic of inquiry into the nature of 
language is not patterns in the verbal behavior of speakers or in the utterances 
they produce, as was the case in the structuralist-behaviorist era until about 60 
years ago, but the apparently unique and domain-specific form of knowledge 
that enables speakers to form and use meaningful linguistic expressions.  
A serious question that this raises is how linguistic knowledge is acquired, 
which naturally involves some fundamental questions about the nature of human 
knowledge in general and about how it is attained. The former is conventionally 
known as the problem of language acquisition (LA) and the latter is briefly 
called epistemology. Clearly, a satisfactory account of the former must be 
consistent with a (satisfactory) theory of the latter.  
If specific questions about knowledge and acquisition of language and 
general questions of epistemology are pursued independently, as has in part 
apparently been the case over the past few decades in linguistics and philosophy 
(if that is the right word), then it will be particularly interesting to see whether an 
understanding of LA from a biolinguistic perspective is or is not consistent with 
constructivist epistemology, so far the most adequate and coherent account of 
human knowledge and learning. If a biolinguistic account of LA is consistent 
with a constructivist account of human knowledge and learning, it offers serious 
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justification for the adequacy of both. Otherwise, the adequacy of either is in 
doubt.  
In general, in a pairing of some theory of LA and an epistemological theory, 
their adequacy or otherwise may be mutually tested by their consistency (or 
inconsistency) with each other. If one seems adequate as far as we know and is 
inconsistent with the other, the inadequacy of the latter follows. To take the 
example of a biolinguistic account of LA in contemporary linguistic theory, 
which seems adequate as far as we know, its inconsistency with empiricism may 
be taken as evidence for the inadequacy of the latter, and by the same token, its 
consistency with a constructivist understanding of human knowledge and 
learning may be regarded as mutually justifying the adequacy of both. It is worth 
noting at this juncture that the adequacy of any theory in general is ultimately 
tested by its consistency or otherwise with some set of assumptions.  
The process of language acquisition continues to be one of the most 
important, and one of the most difficult, problems of linguistic theory. A theory 
of language meets what is known as the condition of explanatory adequacy if it 
offers a satisfactory account of LA. The now standard assumption in the 
biolinguistic approach to language is that LA is made possible by a more or less 
domain-specific innate form of knowledge, sometimes called the faculty of 
language FL (cf. Chomsky 2007, for example). It continues to be universally 
assumed in this approach that a human child’s innate mental predisposition 
must, at least in part, be specific to language. This innate form of knowledge is 
commonly called universal grammar (UG), which contains general principles of 
natural language not derivable from any other language-independent faculty. 
The assumption that a newborn is innately endowed with UG is supported, 
almost dictated, in addition, by the observation that variation across languages 
appears to be restricted between rather narrow limits, a fact that calls for some 
explanation. UG accounts for that. 
In a very brief summary of a theory of LA, it is a mental process whereby a 
child genetically endowed with the prerequisite knowledge containing UG 
constructs the grammar of a particular language, provided that some external 
conditions in the form of some linguistic stimuli that trigger the process obtain. 
To focus on the central idea now, setting aside all other detail, the grammar of a 
particular language is not learned from others, nor is it experienced in any sense 
of the term. The rules of a language are constructed by the child, on the basis 
and with the use of what may be called his prior (innate) knowledge. In other 
words, none of the child’s knowledge of language comes from without; it all 
grows within the child’s mind (cf. Chomsky 1993, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2007). 
The innateness hypothesis in a biolinguistic account of LA could not be 
more consistent with a constructivist theory of knowledge and learning, where 
the central assumption is that no knowledge ever comes from conditions external 
to the mind, but instead, all human knowledge is constructed in and by the mind, 
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which possesses the innate biological prerequisites, such as FL in the case of 
language. (For more discussion of the pedagogically and linguistically relevant 
aspects of constructivist epistemology, see Nahalka 1997a, b, c, and Czeglédi 
2008, respectively.) 
If correct, the constructivist assumption that all new knowledge is 
constructed on the basis of some prior knowledge, including some innate genetic 
endowments, is crucial for language pedagogy (and for pedagogy in general). 
Notice that the assumption that (new) knowledge is constructed by (old or prior) 
knowledge implies that whatever knowledge the mind contains already, it will of 
necessity determine any subsequent knowledge construction. Put simply, old or 
prior knowledge is not only the prerequisite for knowledge construction, but 
completely accounts for the shape of any new knowledge that it constructs. It is 
significant that this is maximally consistent with the prediction UG makes about 
the highly limited variation in the structure of (the mental grammars of) 
languages. 
Somewhat surprisingly perhaps, though it seems very natural in hindsight, 
one of the clearest expressions of the idea is in Barnlund’s (s.a. [2003]) 
transactional theory of human communication, where he explicitly postulates 
that the evolution of meaning, as he calls the process of communication, is 
irreversible. Put more informally, it means that the construction of meaning or 
knowledge can only go forward, the knowledge already constructed determining 
at every stage the shape of any and all subsequently constructed knowledge. Its 
implication for pedagogy is straightforward: learning is irreversible. Whatever 
you have learned, or are innately endowed with, already is decisive about what 
you may (or may want to) learn next.  
The effects of prior knowledge are complex. On the one hand, it is a 
condition that makes learning possible at all, but at times, and from certain 
perspectives, it may also be a hindrance. It is because the knowledge a person 
has at any stage of knowledge growth does not make learning just about 
anything possible, a truism that merits more attention than it traditionally 
receives. The knowledge a person possesses not only facilitates the acquisition 
of new knowledge, but imposes serious restrictions on the kind of knowledge 
that is attainable. Again, a particularly conspicuous example of this is the limited 
variation in attainable languages, restricted by innate UG.  
If these assumptions are correct, the chief lesson for pedagogy to learn from 
them is that, regardless of the desirability or otherwise of the effect a learner’s 
prior knowledge has on their learning, it cannot be ignored in any form of 
teaching. It raises some important questions about what prior knowledge a 
teacher of a foreign language may or may not assume in their learners’ minds 
and how that may affect their learning. Traditionally, these questions have either 
been ignored completely, or at best, resolved by some tacit, and often false, 
assumptions in the intuition of some teachers, such as the baseless belief, for 
120 Csaba Czeglédi 
example, that a person must study the grammar of their own language in order 
for them to be able to learn the grammar of another.  
Although the question of what prior knowledge each learner brings to 
learning a foreign language is very difficult to answer, an important part of it 
may be safely assumed. By the time a child goes to school and perhaps begins to 
learn a foreign language, they will have constructed a mental grammar of their 
mother tongue, equivalent in all important ways to any adult’s knowledge of the 
language. The role a person’s mental grammar of their first language plays in the 
acquisition of a second may not be completely clear, but the fact that it is there 
cannot be ignored. Its presence in learners’ minds must be assumed and, if 
understood, it may be exploited in various ways. At least this much is clear. 
What seems a much harder question to answer is how much, if any, is left 
of UG in a person’s mind, after its parameters have been set in LA, yielding the 
mental grammar of L1. Assuming that LA is a process of setting the values of 
the parameters represented in UG for any particular language, some questions, 
particularly important for language pedagogy, arise about how, if at all, some 
principles of UG/FL, the general principles responsible for the growth and 
maturation of mental grammars in speakers, remain functional after the 
acquisition of the first language is complete. Although its parameters have been 
set, with some of their values probably lost forever, it is unlikely that UG is 
entirely erased when LA is complete. Perhaps the opposite is true. Perhaps the 
process of setting the parameters in UG for the mental grammar of a particular 
language contributes to the retention of some of its principles. Although this is 
entirely speculative, some simple observations of second or foreign language 
acquisition appear to suggest that learners continue to have access to some 
general and unlearnable, therefore innate, principles of language throughout 
much of their lives. 
No learner of a foreign language is surprised to see, for example, that the 
words of any language may be combined with each other into structurally 
complex expressions. In fact, this is precisely what any learner expects to be the 
case. What they would find surprising would be to see that “a foreign language,” 
say English, did not have this property. An equally natural expectation of any 
learner of a foreign language L2 is that the L2 equivalent of “My husband is a 
bachelor” is just as anomalous as it is in English, violating some general 
semantic constraints. To mention one more example, it is part of everybody’s 
implicit knowledge that the equivalents of personal pronouns like he, they, etc., 
reflexives like herself, and reciprocals like each other in English are subject to 
the same general syntactic and semantic restrictions in any other language where 
nominal expressions of this kind are part of the Lexicon, such as Hungarian, for 
instance. The principles of binding, as the restrictions just mentioned are 
technically known (cf. Chomsky 1981), are part of UG, the innate universal 
mental grammar of natural language, and apparently remain operative following 
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the completion of LA. That this is very likely the case, and that it is implicitly 
understood by Hungarian teachers of English as a foreign language, for instance, 
is suggested by the fact the binding principles are never explicitly taught to 
Hungarian learners of English either in class or in print, apparently causing little 
if any problem to learners in avoiding the structures whose generation is 
prevented by the same unlearned principles in both languages.  
If correct, the assumption predicts that teaching the principles of binding as 
rules of L2 in teaching English as a foreign language to Hungarian learners, for 
example, would not only be time wasted, because all there is to be known is 
known already, but it might even be confusing to learners. The same applies to 
any other general principles of language or its use. A foreign language teacher 
may have a tacit understanding of their learners’ implicit knowledge of some 
general principles of language, as is apparently the case with principles of 
binding, or/and she may develop an explicit awareness of some general 
principles of language and its use. As was already suggested above, the more a 
foreign language teacher is aware of universal principles of language and its use, 
which, importantly, they can confidently assume to be part of their learners’ 
prior knowledge, the more efficient their teaching may be. 
Something has always been assumed about learner’s prior knowledge and 
abilities in pedagogy one way or another. One of the principal contributions of 
constructivism to a theory of learning and teaching is that a tacit understanding 
of the central role a learner’s own knowledge plays in the learning process has 
been brought to the surface, formulated explicitly as a principle of knowledge 
construction, the idea that knowledge is irreversibly constructed by knowledge. 
If this is correct, a natural condition on teaching is easily derived: efficient and 
successful teaching presupposes an ideally explicit awareness of learners’ prior 
knowledge. Otherwise the efficiency of teaching may suffer in various ways.  
For one, learning potentials offered by learners’ prior knowledge may 
remain partly unexploited. What is worse, teaching may redundantly, even 
harmfully at times, target areas of knowledge already present and fully 
developed in learners’ minds.  
As was suggested early on, and as was then derived from some simple 
principles of learning, teaching goals may and must be formulated with regard to 
the knowledge learners already have, in part as biological endowment. An 
explicit awareness of the latter may help avoid a number of misunderstandings, 
otherwise almost inevitable.  
As was implicit throughout this discussion, an important part of the 
awareness just mentioned is understanding that no teacher may ever be 
completely aware of the prior knowledge of their learners, or of their own. What 
any teacher can do, though, is work out the assumptions about their learners’ 
(and their own) prior knowledge, on which the formulation of particular teaching 
goals must be explicitly based. This will allow a teacher to evaluate those 
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assumptions and decide whether or not they are reasonable or justifiable. As was 
repeatedly pointed out above, at least some of the relevant assumptions have 
already been justified by independent research in linguistics and philosophy, for 
example. Equally importantly, all major empiricist assumptions conventionally 
adopted in pedagogy have been shown to be false. If taken seriously and applied 
consistently, these general conclusions may contribute in important ways to a 
radical reformulation of the general goals of language pedagogy and to 
enhancing the efficiency of FLT. 
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